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Fixing the California Supreme Court’s 
Limitation of Post-Conviction Discovery 
 
Jasmine Berndt* 
Following the Los Angeles Rampart Scandal, a concerned California legislature 
created post-conviction procedures intended to help wrongfully convicted people 
challenge convictions resulting from government misconduct. One of these 
mechanisms was California Penal Code section 1054.9, which allowed defendant-
petitioners attacking sentences of death or life without parole to discover evidence to 
which they would have been entitled at trial upon a minimal showing. After years of 
broadly interpreting the statute, the California Supreme Court reversed direction with 
its decision in Barnett v. Superior Court, where it created a new hurdle for those 
seeking discovery: Defendant-petitioners must now show a reasonable basis for 
believing the requested discovery actually exists. This Note questions the bases for the 
Barnett decision’s narrowing of post-conviction discovery and considers how this case 
will affect defendant-petitioners’ ability to discover evidence of government misconduct 
in the future. In order to better identify and present claims of government misconduct, 
this Note looks to North Carolina’s open-file discovery statute as inspiration for new 
California legislation. 
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In March 2011, San Francisco’s Public Defender, Jeff Adachi, 
exposed a rash of police misconduct when he released surveillance 
videotapes that showed plain-clothes police officers conducting illegal 
drug searches in residential hotels.1 These tapes caused particular 
outrage because they revealed significant inaccuracies in the officers’ 
incident reports and in-court testimony.2 According to the officers’ sworn 
statements, they had made legal searches and seizures following the 
applicable law, but the videos portrayed Fourth Amendment violations.3 
On March 2, 2011, San Francisco’s District Attorney and former 
Police Chief,4 George Gascon, announced that his office would be 
 
 1. See Michael Cabanatuan, SF Officers Accused of Illegal Searches, Perjury, S.F. Chronicle, 
Mar. 3, 2011, at A1; Dan McMenamin, Gascon Says DA’s Office Will Investigate Alleged Police 
Misconduct Videos, SF Appeal (Mar. 2, 2011), http://sfappeal.com/news/2011/03/public-defender- 
releases-videos-he-claims-show-police-misconduct.php. 
 2. See Cabanatuan, supra note 1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Gascon, who had become Police Chief in August 2009, was appointed District Attorney by 
Mayor Gavin Newsom in January 2011. Brent Begin, George Gascon’s Impartiality in Dealing with San 
Francisco Police Tested, S.F. Examiner (Mar. 10, 2001, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/ 
local/2011/03/george-gascon-s-impartiality-dealing-san-francisco-police-tested. 
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investigating the events.5 In less than a week, his office dropped sixty-
eight pending cases involving the same police officers due to insufficient 
evidence.6 Although Gascon disclaimed any conflict of interest based on 
the fact that he had been the Police Chief at the time one of the videos 
was shot, he eventually bowed to pressure and turned the investigation 
over to the FBI.7 
The dismissed cases and ongoing FBI investigation demonstrate 
what Adachi initially predicted: The police misconduct in the videos was 
“clearly not an isolated case.”8 Adachi further pointed out that, “[i]t’s 
just chance that [the Public Defender was] able to get the videos.”9 
Concerned about the rights of defendants whose convictions were based 
on the work of the same police officers, Adachi sought to probe into 
convictions going back seven years involving the eight identified 
officers.10 To emphasize the need for this review, he noted the results of 
his office’s recent investigation of the misconduct of a single San 
Francisco Police Department criminalist in 2010.11 After the dismissal of 
700 pending cases, the Public Defenders’ Office reviewed 1170 prior 
convictions, 127 of which had sentences dismissed or reduced.12 
This situation raises a number of pressing questions: How significant 
an issue is misconduct by government officers engaged in law 
enforcement? Do criminal defendants have a fair chance to unearth such 
misconduct at trial? When the public trusts government officials to 
pursue justice and public safety, how can defendants identify and prove 
government misconduct? 
Presumably, California was asking these and similar questions in the 
late 1990s when news of the Rampart Scandal shocked the state. The 
Rampart Scandal involved widespread misconduct by officers in an 
antigang unit within the Los Angeles Police Department.13 State 
investigators found that the officers had engaged in a continuous system 
 
 5. See Cabanatuan, supra note 1. 
 6. Ari Burack, Nearly 70 Cases Dropped by San Francisco DA’s Office in Police Misconduct 
Investigation, S.F. Examiner (Mar. 15, 2001, 9:01 AM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/crime/2011/03/ 
nearly-70-cases-dropped-san-francisco-da-s-office-police-misconduct-investigatio. 
 7. Ari Burack, San Francisco’s Criminal-Case Dismissals Might Slow Down, S.F. Examiner 
(Mar. 15, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/crime/2011/03/san-franciscos-criminal-case-
dismissals-might-slow-down. 
 8. McMenamin, supra note 1. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Burack, supra note 7. 
 11. Id. The San Francisco District Attorney’s Office evidently was aware that the criminalist’s 
work was “jeopardizing” cases, but failed to alert defense attorneys. See Jaxon Van Derbeken, Harris 
Turns Drug Lab Scandal over to State, S.F. Chronicle, Apr. 24, 2010, at A1; Jaxon Van Derbeken, 
Harris’ Top Aide Retiring—Sat on Scandal Tip, S.F. Chronicle, June 12, 2010, at A1. 
 12. Burack, supra note 7. 
 13. Matt Lait & Scott Glover, Rampart Case Takes on Momentum of Its Own, L.A. Times (Dec. 
31, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/print/1999/dec/31/news/mn-49335. 
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of misconduct, using planted evidence, false testimony, and other abuses 
of power to arrest and convict people.14 This scandal raised questions 
about a huge number of past and pending criminal cases, and the District 
Attorney’s ability to address all of the related cases was questionable at 
best.15 
The California state legislature responded to the Rampart Scandal 
with Senate Bill 1391. The bill was intended to “create[] a process for a 
convicted person, whether or not in custody, to vacate a judgment based 
on fraud or the presentation of false evidence by the government.”16 One 
part of that bill created section 1054.9 of the California Penal Code, 
which established a statutory system of post-conviction discovery for 
prisoners pursuing collateral challenges to sentences of death or life 
without the possibility of parole.17 The plain language of the statute 
instructs courts to grant a defendant-petitioner discovery of all materials 
to which he would have been entitled at trial, upon a showing that good 
faith attempts to retrieve the same materials from his own trial counsel 
were unsuccessful.18 Though it did not reach all potential convictions 
based on government misconduct, the statute gave defendant-petitioners 
facing the most serious sentences access to materials to support habeas 
claims involving the conduct of police officers,19 prosecutors,20 and 
defense counsel.21 
After many years of broad interpretation of section 1054.9,22 the 
prognosis for state post-conviction discovery changed dramatically in 
August 2010, when the California Supreme Court issued its decision in 
Barnett v. Superior Court.23 In Barnett, the court announced that 
defendant-petitioners seeking to obtain discovery beyond what was 
already provided at trial “must show a reasonable basis to believe that 
specific requested materials actually exist.”24 While this “reasonable 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Henry Weinstein, Rampart Probe May Now Affect Over 3,000 Cases, L.A. Times (Dec. 15, 
1999), http://articles.latimes.com/print/1999/dec/15/news/mn-44050. 
 16. Assemb. Comm. on Pub. Safety, Public Safety 2002: Creating a Safer California 104 (2002). 
 17. Act of Sept. 29, 2002, ch. 1105, § 1, 2002 Cal. Stat. 7100, 7100–01. 
 18. Cal. Penal Code § 1054.9(a)–(b) (2011). 
 19. At trial, defendants who file a specific motion are entitled to evidence of police misconduct 
from officers’ personnel files under certain circumstances. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1043–1047 (2011). 
 20. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence 
is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.”); see also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959) (“[T]he district attorney has the 
responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth.” (citing People v. 
Savvides, 154 N.Y.S. 2d 885, 887 (N.Y. 1956))). 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 130–31. 
 22. In re Steele, 85 P.3d 444, 451 (Cal. 2004). 
 23. 237 P.3d 980 (Cal. 2010). 
 24. Id. at 981. 
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basis” language seems innocuous, in reality it means that the most 
egregious cases of government misconduct will continue undetected. 
Because materials that were not disclosed at trial are by their nature 
hidden from the defense, the likelihood of a defendant-petitioner 
producing evidence that such items actually exists is a matter of luck. 
This Note argues that the Barnett court got it wrong when it stated 
that the purpose of section 1054.9 was only “to allow defendants to 
receive materials they have reason to believe they are missing.”25 This 
position disregards the historical context that led to Senate Bill 1391, the 
plain language of the statute, and the demonstrable legislative intent 
that, using section 1054.9, defendant-petitioners should be able to access 
any material to which they would have been entitled at trial simply by 
showing that the same evidence could not be obtained from trial counsel. 
The Barnett decision significantly narrows the reach of discovery 
requests under section 1054.9 and has the potential to undermine its use 
in the very situations it was intended to address. 
This Note is divided into four parts. Part I traces the history of post-
conviction discovery in California, from the judicially created rule that 
preceded the statutory scheme, through section 1054.9’s creation and 
early interpretation to the Barnett decision.26 Part II critically analyzes 
the Barnett court’s stated justifications for creating the reasonable-basis 
requirement and explains why each lacks merit. Part III describes how 
the Barnett decision could impact each of three categories of discovery 
requests: specific document identification, pattern and practice, and 
preexisting duty. Finally, Part IV looks to North Carolina’s open-file 
discovery statute as inspiration for new California legislation to preserve 
habeas petitioners’ ability to access evidence of government misconduct 
for post-conviction challenges. 
I.  Historical Background 
The last decade has seen rapid changes in California’s system of 
post-conviction discovery. The first major case to interpret section 1054.9 
specified the types of discovery request included within the plain 
language of the statute but did not limit its scope. Just six years later, the 
California Supreme Court narrowed the application of the statute by 
imposing a “reasonable basis” requirement that will prevent discovery in 
some of the very situations for which it was intended. 
 
 25. Id. at 985. 
 26. Catlin v. Superior Court, 245 P.3d 860 (Cal. 2011), decided after Barnett, addressed the 
question of time limits for section 1054.9 discovery motions. 
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A. Section 1054.9 of the California Penal Code 
Prior to 2002, California lacked a statute governing post-conviction 
discovery.27 Instead, courts addressed discovery requests on a case-by-
case basis,28 and People v. Gonzalez governed.29  
Gonzalez concerned a habeas petitioner’s right to receive discovery 
in the face of breaking news of a ten-year “conspiracy to suborn perjury 
involving the police, prosecutors and informants.”30 Eight years after 
Gonzalez’s conviction, a scandal erupted involving the use of jailhouse 
informants known to be unreliable by the District Attorney’s Office.31 
When Gonzalez learned that this practice overlapped with his own case, 
he filed a motion seeking discovery of the prosecution’s files on the 
jailhouse informant who had testified against him.32 Though he did not 
know whether the informant in his case was involved in the scandal, 
Gonzalez claimed that the scandal cast a doubt on the informant’s 
veracity and that the materials were necessary to attack his conviction on 
habeas.33 The trial court ordered the requested discovery.34 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court found that because there 
was no longer any proceeding in the case before the trial court, the trial 
court had no jurisdiction over the case and therefore no authority “to 
order ‘free-floating’ post-judgment discovery.”35 It went on to explain 
that pretrial discovery rights did not extend post-conviction.36 The court 
stated that unless a defendant-petitioner states a prima facie claim, which 
the court would be required to grant if true, there is no jurisdiction for 
even the California Supreme Court to order discovery.37 Because 
Gonzalez had not made a prima facie case that the informant who 
testified against him had given false testimony or that the prosecutor had 
withheld evidence of the same, the court would not order discovery in his 
case.38 The court rejected the defendant-petitioner’s argument that this 
created a “Catch-22” that required him to prove his claim in order for 
 
 27. Cal. S. Rules Comm., Bill Analysis, S. 2002-1391, 2002 Sess., at 2.  
 28. See id. at 5.  
 29. Id. (discussing People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159 (Cal. 1990)). 
 30. People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1203 (Cal. 1990); see Ted Rohrlich, Scandal over Jail 
Informants Forces Retrial, L.A. Times, Dec. 16, 1989, at 1; see also Ted Rohrlich, Man Fingered by 
Informant to Be Freed, L.A. Times, Apr. 5, 1991, at 3 (describing informant scandal); Ted Rohrlich, 
Perjurer Sentenced to 3 Years, L.A. Times, May 20, 1992, at 1 (stating that despite their suspected 
involvement, no law-enforcement agents were convicted in the scandal because it was impossible to 
prove). 
 31. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d at 1203. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1204. 
 37. Id. at 1205. 
 38. Id. 
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the court to grant discovery of the evidence needed to prove his claim.39 
Because the defendant-petitioner had no presumption of innocence and 
no right to post-conviction discovery, the court concluded that “[t]he 
state may properly require that a defendant obtain some concrete 
information on his own before he invokes collateral remedies against a 
final judgment.”40 The court found that the prosecution’s knowledge of a 
merely potential scandal and their failure to investigate it did not require 
post-judicial intervention. It reasoned that the defendant-petitioner had 
not provided the requisite independent, concrete information that the 
informant in his case had given false testimony.41 
Another scandal compromising the criminal justice system erupted 
in the Rampart Division of the Los Angeles Police Department in 1999. 
When prosecutors charged former police officer Rafael Perez for theft of 
cocaine from the department’s evidence locker, Perez offered to make a 
deal with state investigators.42 He agreed to testify in state court about 
the corruption he witnessed in the department in exchange for favorable 
treatment.43 His subsequent confession opened a Pandora’s box of police 
misconduct. As investigators corroborated Perez’s testimony, they 
learned that it implicated seventy police officers in a range of misconduct 
including illegal shootings and beatings, planting evidence, committing 
perjury, selling drugs, and intimidating witnesses.44 Courts threw out 
many pending cases, and attorneys challenged previously obtained 
convictions.45 
The Rampart Scandal revealed shortcomings in the legal system’s 
readiness to unearth and address law-enforcement misconduct. 
Wrongdoing and poor performance reached beyond the police 
department to prosecutors and defense attorneys. As the evidence of 
police misconduct came to light, prosecutors were less than forthcoming 
about the progression of the investigation and the number of affected 
cases. Though the District Attorney’s Office knew people had been 
falsely convicted, it began reopening cases only after the police 
department threatened to go to the press with the story.46 
Representatives from the District Attorney’s Office misled the public 
about the number of police officers implicated in the scandal.47 The 
scandal even revealed defense counsel misconduct: In a civil lawsuit, a 
 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 1206. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Lait & Glover, supra note 13.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Steve Berry et al., D.A. Says No New Charges Expected in Rampart Probe, L.A. Times, Nov. 
8, 2001, at 1.  
 45. Id. 
 46. See Lait & Glover, supra note 13. 
 47. Scott Glover & Matt Lait, Transcripts on Rampart Belie D.A., L.A. Times, Mar. 1, 2003, at 1. 
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jury found the public defender who represented a victim of the scandal 
negligent for failing to uncover the police misconduct that led to the 
victim’s wrongful conviction.48 
In response, in 2002 Senator John Burton introduced Senate Bill 
1391, a three-part bill designed to correct the post-conviction system’s 
inability to provide meaningful review for prisoners who had been 
victims of government misconduct.49 The purpose of the bill was “to 
provide a reasonable avenue for habeas counsel to obtain documents to 
which trial counsel was already legally entitled.”50 For purposes of this 
Note, the most relevant provision of the bill was the addition of section 
1054.9 to the California Penal Code, which permitted and regulated post-
conviction discovery for defendants filing writs of habeas corpus or 
motions to vacate judgment.51 Specifically, the law provides that courts 
shall grant discovery after the defendant-petitioner shows an 
unsuccessful, good faith effort to get discovery materials from his trial 
counsel.52 “Discovery materials” for purposes of this provision are all 
materials (except DNA and other physical evidence) to which the 
defendant would have been entitled at trial.53 
Senate Bill 1391 has two major provisions besides 1054.9 that are 
significant to an understanding of the legislature’s purpose. First, the bill 
created a right for someone who discovers new evidence of police 
misconduct after his incarceration ends to challenge his conviction within 
a year of the discovery.54 The Legislative Counsel’s Digest explained that 
this was necessary because defendants had no recourse to challenge their 
convictions if evidence of government misconduct came to light only 
after they had served their sentences.55 As a result, they could not use this 
new evidence of innocence to clear their names and to ameliorate the 
collateral effects of the conviction.56 Second, the bill removed the sunset 
provision then in place on California Penal Code section 1417.9, which 
governs the preservation and destruction of DNA evidence.57 This 
change ensured that a system for the preservation of DNA used to 
convict people of crimes would remain in place. 
 
 48. Police officers shot and paralyzed an unarmed man before planting an assault rifle on him. 
Andrew Blankstein, Jury Awards $6.5 Million in Frame-Up, L.A. Times, May 26, 2005, at 3.  
 49. Act of Sept. 29, 2002, ch. 1105, 2002 Cal. Stat. 7100. 
 50. Cal. S. Rules Comm., Bill Analysis, S. 2002-1391, 2002 Sess., at 5. 
 51. Cal. Penal Code § 1054.9(a)–(b) (2011). 
 52. Id. § 1054.9(a). 
 53. Id. § 1054.9(b). Section 1054.9 reserves different procedures for the examination of physical 
evidence and DNA evidence, which are not within the scope of this Note. Id. § 1054.9(c). 
 54. § 3, 2002 Cal. Stat. 7100, 7102 (codified as amended at Cal. Penal Code § 1473.6 (2011)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. § 2. 
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The legislative history of Senate Bill 1391 shows that proponents of 
section 1054.9 focused their argument on the problem of defendants 
whose trial files were lost or destroyed.58 Under Gonzalez, defendant-
petitioners were required to make a prima facie case for relief in order to 
obtain replacements of discovery to which they would have been entitled 
at trial.59 But defendant-petitioners could not meet that requirement 
because the very evidence they needed to present could be found only by 
means of the requested discovery.60 Though simple file reconstruction 
was clearly one legislative prerogative, when considered in the context of 
the Senate Bill as a whole, it seems that the file-reconstruction argument 
was meant to illustrate how “woefully inadequate” the Gonzalez rule 
was, rather than to limit the reach of section 1054.9.61 
Further, the historical context discussed above,62 a statement made 
by the Governor, and the House Committee on Public Safety’s statement 
in its 2002 report of legislation all depict section 1054.9 as one part of a 
broad effort to confront government misconduct. When he signed Senate 
Bill 1391 into law, Governor Gray Davis described, in a letter to the 
Senate, his position and some of the background that went into the bill’s 
creation: 
As Governor, I strongly support the hard working men and women of 
law enforcement. However, nobody is above the law and in the rare 
cases where governmental officials deceive the Courts, there must be 
appropriate remedies. 
This legislation was introduced in the wake of the Rampart cases in 
which numerous felons were released from prison because their 
conviction depended heavily on testimony from law enforcement that 
subsequently turned out to be false. Thus, the provisions of this bill 
were worked out after extensive discussions with the Los Angeles 
District Attorney, the Attorney General, California District Attorney’s 
Association and the California Public Defender’s Association.63 
Similarly, the Assembly Committee on Public Safety issued a report 
in which it discussed the purpose of the bill.64 Senate Bill 1391 is 
discussed in this report under the title “Government Misconduct: Motion 
to Vacate Judgment.”65 After briefly explaining the inadequate legal 
procedures available to convicted prisoners seeking to prove innocence 
in the face of government misconduct such as the Rampart Scandal, the 
report summarized the bill as “creat[ing] a process for a convicted 
 
 58. Cal. S. Rules Comm., Bill Analysis, S. 2002-1391, 2002 Sess., at 4. 
 59. People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1205 (Cal. 1990). 
 60. Cal. S. Rules Comm., Bill Analysis, S. 2002-1391, 2002 Sess., at 5. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See supra text accompanying notes 27–48. 
 63. S. Journal, 2001–2002 Reg. Sess., at 6211 (Cal. 2002). 
 64. Assemb. Comm. on Public Safety, supra note 16, at 104. 
 65. Id. 
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person, whether or not in custody, to vacate a judgment based on fraud 
or the presentation of false evidence by the government.”66 It then 
paraphrased the different components of the bill, including the 
provisions of 1054.9.67 
B. IN RE STEELE 
The California Supreme Court first described the scope of section 
1054.9 in the case of In re Steele.68 The defendant-petitioner in Steele filed 
a motion pursuant to section 1054.9 directly in the Supreme Court, 
asking the court to order the prosecutor and law-enforcement authorities 
in his case to provide him with any materials they possessed pertaining to 
his cooperation with prison officials during a prior incarceration.69 The 
defendant-petitioner knew only that the prosecution had some records 
pertaining to his prior incarceration, but did not know whether they 
actually possessed any records responsive to the request.70 The Attorney 
General claimed that the requested records were outside the scope of the 
statute.71 Because this was the court’s first opportunity to apply 1054.9, it 
analyzed the statutory text and legislative history to instruct future lower 
courts in making determinations regarding the proper scope of the 
statute.72 The court found that both the plain language of the statute and 
the legislative history indicated that section 1054.9 applied to four 
categories of materials. The court summarized: 
  Accordingly, we interpret section 1054.9 to require the trial court, 
on a proper showing of a good faith effort to obtain the materials from 
trial counsel, to order discovery of specific materials currently in the 
possession of the prosecution or law enforcement authorities involved 
in the investigation or prosecution of the case that the defendant can 
show either (1) the prosecution did provide at time of trial but have 
since become lost to the defendant; (2) the prosecution should have 
provided at time of trial because they came within the scope of a 
discovery order the trial court actually issued at that time, a statutory 
duty to provide discovery, or the constitutional duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence; (3) the prosecution should have provided at time 
of trial because the defense specifically requested them at that time 
and was entitled to receive them; or (4) the prosecution had no 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 104–05; see supra text accompanying notes 52–57. 
 68. 85 P.3d 444 (Cal. 2004). 
 69. Id. at 447–48. 
 70. Id. at 448. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 450 (stating that, while the court could dismiss the motion without prejudice, instead it 
would consider the merits in order to provide guidance to future courts addressing such motions). The 
court also articulated the procedure for section 1054.9 motions because the statute did not specifically 
describe one. Id. at 449–50 (explaining that petitioners should first attempt to arrange for permissible 
discovery informally and then, in the case of conflicts, the defendant generally should file a section 
1054.9 motion in the trial court of his conviction). 
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obligation to provide at time of trial absent a specific defense request, 
but to which the defendant would have been entitled at time of trial 
had the defendant specifically requested them.73 
Of the four categories of discoverable evidence described in Steele, 
only the first describes file reconstruction, while the remaining three 
refer to material that the defendant-petitioner never received in the first 
place, though he was, or would have been, entitled to it. The court then 
found that Steele’s request fell into the fourth category described above 
because it dealt with information that would not necessarily be 
considered exculpatory by the prosecutor.74 However, if defense counsel 
had requested this information in support of a mitigation theory at trial, 
the prosecutor would have been on notice of its exculpatory nature and 
been obligated to provide it.75 
The court also reviewed the language of the request made in Steele 
and found it “reasonably specific.”76 The request asked for: 
Any and all reports, memoranda, notes, tape recordings, statements, 
transcripts, confidential files, debriefing documents, and/or summaries 
documenting or referring to petitioner’s leaving the Nuestra Familia; to 
information provided by petitioner regarding the Nuestra Familia, its 
members and associates, and non-member collaborators; and to 
assistance provided by petitioner in prosecutions pursued by the State 
of California and/or local prosecutors against the Nuestra Familia and 
others accused of collaborating with the Nuestra Familia in the 
commission of crimes.77 
Although the defendant-petitioner did not identify specific 
documents or prove that such documents existed, the court described the 
request as a “focused request for specific information . . . . within the 
scope of section 1054.9.”78 As a result, the court remanded the case to the 
lower court, ordering discovery of the requested records.79 
C. BARNETT V. SUPERIOR COURT 
In the summer of 2010, in Barnett v. Superior Court the California 
Supreme Court changed the scope of discovery materials that habeas 
petitioners in California courts can seek under section 1054.9.80 The 
Barnett court reviewed the lower court’s ruling that a defendant-
petitioner seeking post-conviction discovery was not required to show 
 
 73. Id. at 453. 
 74. Id. at 456. 
 75. The court found it insignificant that the record was unclear whether the material had, in fact, 
been requested at trial. Id. 
 76. Id. at 457. 
 77. Id. at 447–48. 
 78. Id. at 457. 
 79. Id. 
 80. 237 P.3d 980 (Cal. 2010). 
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that the requested materials actually existed.81 Because Barnett involved 
twenty-four different discovery requests of varying specificity, the court 
addressed the issue abstractly.82 It held that because the main goal of the 
legislature when creating section 1054.9 was file reconstruction, and 
because the statute was meant to be an efficient tool, “defendants must 
show they have a reasonable basis to believe that the specific materials 
they seek actually exist” in order to receive discovery beyond file 
reconstruction.83 
The exact contours of the reasonable-basis requirement were not 
outlined in the decision. The California Supreme Court’s response to the 
lower court’s reasoning for refusing to require the reasonable-basis 
standard suggests how the California Supreme Court might interpret the 
standard in the future.84 The California Court of Appeal had found that 
the standard would be virtually impossible for defendant-petitioners to 
meet.85 The California Supreme Court conceded that would be true if the 
purpose of the statute were to allow a defendant-petitioner to discover 
“any material that might exist,” but asserted instead that the purpose of 
the statute was to permit defendant-petitioners to discover “materials 
they have reason to believe they are missing.”86 The court then listed a 
number of circumstances where evidence would allow defendant-
petitioners to meet the reasonable-basis requirement: references in 
witness testimony, documents already possessed by the defense, or 
evidence in the trial transcripts of specific documents that the defense 
was never provided.87 If these examples define the scope of discovery, 
then Barnett imposes a higher threshold than that stated in the plain 
language of section 1054.9 and in the court’s earlier interpretation in 
Steele. 
II.  The BARNETT Court’s Misreading of the Meaning and 
Purpose of Section 1054.9 
Although the language of section 1054.9 of the California Penal 
Code is clear on the issues of scope and the defendant-petitioner’s 
threshold showing, the Barnett court relied instead on its earlier 
decisions, legislative history, and the evidence code to ascertain a 
legislative purpose contradictory to the plain language. Because the plain 
language of section 1054.9 clearly requires a defendant-petitioner to 
show nothing more than that good faith efforts to obtain materials from 
 
 81. Id. at 982. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 986. 
 84. Id. at 984–85. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 985. 
 87. Id. at 984–85. 
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trial counsel were unsuccessful, the Barnett court never should have 
considered legislative intent. However, if the court was determined to 
look at more than just the statute’s plain meaning, then it should have 
considered the historical context and legislative materials indicating that 
the legislature intended the statute to have a broad reach. 
A. Disregarding the Plain Meaning 
The plain language a statute is regarded as the first indication of the 
legislature’s intent.88 If the language of the statute is clear, the courts 
should refrain from engaging in statutory construction.89 Section 1054.9 
states in relevant part: 
  (a) Upon the prosecution of a postconviction writ of habeas corpus 
or a motion to vacate a judgment in a case in which a sentence of death 
or of life in prison without the possibility of parole has been imposed, 
and on a showing that good faith efforts to obtain discovery materials 
from trial counsel were made and were unsuccessful, the court shall, 
except as provided in subdivision (c) [relating to physical evidence], 
order that the defendant be provided reasonable access to any of the 
materials described in subdivision (b). 
  (b) For purposes of this section, “discovery materials” means 
materials in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement 
authorities to which the same defendant would have been entitled at 
time of trial.90 
When the court in Steele analyzed the statutory language with 
regard to scope, the court found that language unambiguous.91 It rejected 
the Attorney General’s assertion that the statute was intended as a file-
reconstruction statute and explained, “The plain language here does not 
limit the discovery materials to materials the defense once actually 
possessed to the exclusion of materials the defense did not possess but to 
which it would have been entitled at time of trial.”92 The court 
specifically noted that the legislature used the words “would have been 
entitled to at time of trial”93 rather than “actually possessed.”94 As a 
result, the court described all of the categories of evidence that fell within 
the statute’s scope.95 
Section 1054.9 is similarly clear with regard to the showing required 
when requesting discovery. Specifically, the statute states that courts 
shall order discovery to defendant-petitioners “on a showing that good 
 
 88. In re Steele, 85 P.3d 444, 450 (Cal. 2004) (quoting People v. Statum, 50 P.3d 355, 359 (Cal. 2002)). 
 89. People v. Statum, 50 P.3d 355, 359 (Cal. 2002). 
 90. Barnett, 237 P.3d at 983 (alteration in original) (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 1054.9 (2011)). 
 91. 85 P.3d at 451. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 450 (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 1054.9). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
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faith efforts to obtain discovery materials from trial counsel were made 
and were unsuccessful.”96 The statute requires nothing more and makes 
no distinction between the showing required for discovery to replace 
documents that were already provided at trial (file reconstruction) and 
discovery that the defendant-petitioner never received. The legislature 
could have, but did not, impose different or additional requirements for 
requests of material beyond file reconstruction. For instance, the 
legislature could have insisted that in order to obtain materials beyond 
file reconstruction, the defendant-petitioner must show an evidentiary 
basis for believing the materials actually exist, along with the stated 
showing that the discovery could not be obtained from trial counsel. Its 
decision not to do so indicates that it intended no such limitation. 
The Barnett court should have noted the statute’s clarity on scope 
and threshold showing and stopped its analysis there. Despite the fact 
that the court previously had found the statutory language clear as to the 
scope of section 1054.9 and applied it to each of the four evidence 
categories in Steele,97 in Barnett it asserted that the statute had a narrower 
scope.98 It said that the scope of discovery was no longer the materials 
that the defendant-petitioner “would have been entitled to at trial,” but 
only those “materials they have reason to believe they are missing.”99 The 
court added the related threshold showing, requiring defendant-
petitioners to present a reasonable basis for their belief that discovery 
documents exist.100 As Justice Werdegar noted in her dissenting opinion, 
the court’s “interpretation of the post-conviction discovery statute 
(§ 1054.9), lack[ed] any basis in the statute’s language, [and was] wholly 
illegitimate.”101 
B. The BARNETT Court’s Arguments for the Reasonable-Basis 
Requirement 
Instead of resting on the previously interpreted plain meaning of the 
statute, the court embarked on the project of discerning legislative intent. 
However, it failed to identify any expression of the legislature that would 
support its finding regarding intent. The court misapplied its own 
precedent and used the legislature’s desire for efficiency to craft its 
labored claim that section 1054.9 “requires defendants who seek discovery 
beyond file reconstruction to show a reasonable basis to believe that other 
specific materials actually exist.”102 The court considered four different 
 
 96. Cal. Penal Code § 1054.9. 
 97. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
 98. Barnett v. Superior Court, 237 P.3d 983, 985 (Cal. 2010). 
 99. Id. at 985. 
 100. Id. at 986. 
 101. Id. at 990 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. at 984 (majority opinion). 
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pieces of information before coming to this summary conclusion. Upon 
examination, not a single one of these points suggests that the legislature 
intended for the court to rule as it did. 
First, the court framed its discussion by noting the limits on section 
1054.9 recognized in Steele. It suggested that the scope of discovery 
should be circumscribed, stating that the statute permits only “limited 
discovery,” not “free floating” discovery requests.103 While these phrases 
appear to support the court’s position when read on their own, their 
original contexts reveal the very specific meaning these phrases were first 
used to convey. When the Steele court used these phrases to describe the 
scope of section 1054.9, it was not to narrow the plain language of the 
statute, but merely to identify the limits that were evident on its face. It 
explained that the statute does not permit “‘free floating’ discovery 
asking for virtually anything the prosecution possesses”;104 instead, it 
applies exclusively to materials that the prosecution and law-
enforcement agencies currently possess and to which the defendant-
petitioner was entitled at trial and does not currently possess.105 The term 
“free floating” was taken from Gonzalez, where the court used the term 
to refer to discovery requests made to a court that has no jurisdiction 
over a case.106 
Next, the court discussed the repeated use of the word “specific” in 
Steele to describe certain categories of evidence to which a defendant-
petitioner is entitled (beyond file reconstruction).107 The court gave one 
such example of its use of the word “specific”: “[W]e said the obtainable 
discovery ‘includes specific materials that the defendant can show the 
prosecution should have provided (but did not provide) at the time of 
trial . . . .’”108 With this, the court suggested that Steele referred to the 
defendant-petitioner’s need to identify specific documents. In fact, 
though the Steele court repeatedly used the word “specific,” it did so to 
convey a meaning different from the one implied in Barnett. Steele 
referred to a defendant-petitioner’s need to describe with specificity in 
the discovery request the kind of materials sought so as to make clear 
what material is sought and why it must be provided.109 Thus, the court 
explained that the prosecution would have been obligated to provide 
evidence that Steele informed on a prison gang after the defense made a 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. In re Steele, 85 P.3d 444, 451 (Cal. 2004) (citing People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1203 (Cal. 
1990)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1203 (Cal. 1990). 
 107. Barnett, 237 P.3d at 984. 
 108. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Steele, 85 P.3d at 451). 
 109. 85 P.3d at 452–57. 
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specific request for that material, thereby identifying such information as 
mitigating.110 
The facts of Steele clearly demonstrate that the case did not impose 
a requirement on defendant-petitioners to show that specific evidence 
exists.111 The court considered Steele’s discovery request for documents 
relating to the defendant-petitioner’s leaving, informing on, and assisting 
in the investigation and prosecution of a prison gang.112 It determined 
that, because the evidence supported the defense’s mitigation theory, the 
requested material fell in the category of evidence to which the 
defendant-petitioner would have been entitled at trial had he made a 
specific request, but the exculpatory value would not have been evident 
to the prosecutor.113 The court determined that the wording of Steele’s 
request met the specificity requirement and was “a focused request for 
specific information.”114 Thus, the specificity required is not a showing 
that a specific document exists, but that the request describes the specific 
type of information sought. 
The court’s third offer in support of the reasonable-basis 
requirement was the mention in Steele that a defendant-petitioner 
requesting discovery must overcome the presumption under section 664 
of the California Evidence Code115 that an official duty has been regularly 
performed.116 However, the presumption provided by the Evidence Code 
affects burden of proof and is not relevant in discovery proceedings.117 
Each of the cases cited to support the government’s position involved the 
burden of proof for elements of substantive legal claims where the 
prosecutor’s actions were at issue.118 Unlike those substantive elements, 
 
 110. Id. at 456–57. 
 111. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Habeas Corpus Resource Center in Partial Support of Both 
Parties and Otherwise in Support of Petitioner Lee Max Barnett at 31–32, Barnett, 237 P.3d 980 (No. 
S165522), 2009 CA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1268, at *56–57 [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae Habeas 
Corpus Resource Center]. 
 112. Steele, 85 P.3d at 447–48. 
 113. Id. at 456. 
 114. Id. at 457. 
 115. Cal. Evid. Code § 664 (2011) (“It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.”). 
 116. Barnett, 237 P.3d at 984. 
 117. Cal. Evid. Code § 660 (2011); see also Application of California Public Defenders’ 
Association for Leave to File Brief of Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Petitioner Lee Max Barnett, Brief 
of Amicus Curiae at 8, Barnett, 237 P.3d 980 (No. S165522), 2009 CA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1269, at *6 
[hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae California Public Defenders’ Ass’n]. 
 118. See Petition for Review at 21, Barnett, 237 P.3d 980 (No. S150229), 2007 CA S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 3236, at 35–36. (citing People v. Superior Court, 47 P.2d 724, 729–30 (Cal. 1935), Miller v. 
Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591, 606 (Ct. App. 2002), and People v. Cummings, 296 P.2d 610, 615 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1956)). But see People v. Superior Court, 47 P.2d at 729–30 (holding that, in a case to set 
aside an order vacating judgment, the state did not have to prove that the prosecutor performed his 
duty because of the evidentiary presumption); Miller, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606 (“Where a criminal 
defendant raises official misconduct as a defense, he or she bears the burden of proof on this issue.”); 
Cummings, 296 P.2d at 615 (stating that in an appeal from a criminal conviction and absent evidence of 
bad faith in cross examination, courts presume the prosecutor acted in good faith). 
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section 1054.9 does not require defendant-petitioners to show anything at 
all about the prosecutor. The statute merely requires a showing that the 
defendant-petitioner made a good faith attempt to obtain the discovery 
from his own trial counsel. Furthermore, Steele only alluded to the 
presumption under the Evidence Code in dicta, after dismissing the 
Attorney General’s argument that section 664 limited the scope of 
discovery.119 In so doing, it cited Gonzalez, which the legislature explicitly 
rejected when it created a replacement post-conviction scheme.120 The 
legislature created section 1054.9 from whole cloth with only one 
threshold barrier to discovery: that the defendant-petitioner made a good 
faith effort to first obtain from trial counsel any evidence to which he was 
entitled at trial.121 
Assuming arguendo that Evidence Code section 664 is relevant to 
discovery requests under section 1054.9, application of Barnett’s 
reasonable-basis requirement to all post-conviction discovery requests is 
overbroad. Steele specifically stated that section 1054.9 gave defendant-
petitioners access to evidence that would have been available only upon 
request at trial, even if no such request was made (the fourth category of 
discoverable evidence described in Steele).122 For example, a criminal 
defendant is not automatically entitled to the prosecution’s evidence that 
the defendant was exposed to toxic chemicals as an infant or toddler 
unless the defense attorney makes a request that would put the 
prosecutor on notice that such evidence is material to a defense 
mitigation theory. A defendant-petitioner who requests this evidence for 
the first time post-conviction does so without suggesting that the 
prosecutor engaged in misconduct. Despite the inapplicability of section 
664 of the Evidence Code in such circumstances, the Barnett decision 
imposed the reasonable-basis requirement on evidence that the 
prosecution never had a prior duty to provide, just as it did on those 
categories that imply misconduct. 
Finally, the Barnett court was wrong in stating that file 
reconstruction was the legislature’s primary concern in passing the 
statute.123 There is no doubt that one goal the legislature sought to 
achieve through the implementation of section 1054.9 was simplified file 
reconstruction. Proponents of the bill explained to the legislature the 
injustice that befell defendant-petitioners whose trial files were lost or 
destroyed under the preexisting Gonzalez scheme.124 However, the court 
in Steele acknowledged that both the plain text of the statute and the 
 
 119. 85 P.3d at 451. 
 120. Cal. S. Rules Comm., Bill Analysis, S. 2002-1391, 2002 Sess., at 5. 
 121. Cal. Penal Code § 1054.9 (2011). 
 122. See supra text accompanying notes 73–74. 
 123. Barnett v. Superior Court, 237 P.3d 983, 984 (Cal. 2010). 
 124. Cal. S. Rules Comm., Bill Analysis, S. 2002-1391, 2002 Sess., at 5. 
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legislative history indicated that section 1054.9 served a purpose much 
“broader than mere file reconstruction.”125 In the legislature’s own words, 
“The purpose of the proposed legislation is to provide a reasonable 
avenue for habeas counsel to obtain documents to which trial counsel 
was already legally entitled.”126 The events that led to the adoption of this 
statute and the legislative history also demonstrate that the legislature 
had the overarching goal of giving defendant-petitioners additional tools 
to challenge convictions resulting from government misconduct.127 
The Barnett court alluded to several factors in support of imposing a 
reasonable-basis requirement on defendant-petitioners seeking post-
conviction discovery. However, none of those reasons is consistent with 
the context in which the legislation was adopted, the legislative history, 
or California precedent. More importantly, the reasonable-basis 
requirement is contrary to the plain language of the statute. 
III.  Effect of the Reasonable-Basis Requirement 
In Barnett, the defendant-petitioner, amici curiae, and the lower 
court all raised concerns that the reasonable-basis requirement would 
make the discovery of previously undisclosed evidence to which a 
defendant-petitioner was entitled under Steele virtually impossible.128 The 
Barnett court was not bothered by this, having concluded that section 
1054.9’s “purpose is to allow defendants to receive materials they have 
reason to believe they are missing.”129 Despite the court’s rejection of this 
concern, the practical result is that in many circumstances, defendant-
petitioners will never have access to potentially exculpatory discovery 
that they did not obtain at trial.130 In order to understand the impact that 
Barnett will have on discovery requests that seek to obtain material for 
the first time, it is helpful to address these requests based on specificity. 
The specificity of these requests can be described using the following 
categories: extrinsic-document identification, pattern-and-practice claims, 
and preexisting duty. 
 
 125. In re Steele, 85 P.3d 444, 451 (Cal. 2004). 
 126. Cal. S. Rules Comm., Bill Analysis, S. 2002-1391, 2002 Sess., at 5. 
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 49–67. 
 128. See Barnett, 237 P.3d at 984–85; Mr. Barnett's Answer to Attorney General's Petition for 
Review at 23, Barnett, 237 P.3d 980 (No. S150229), 2007 CA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3269, at *37; Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Habeas Corpus Resource Center, supra note 111, at 39–40; Brief of Amicus Curiae 
California Public Defenders’ Ass’n, supra note 117, at 15. 
 129. 237 P.3d at 985. 
 130. In other words, Barnett threatens discovery of the three Steele categories of evidence that 
defendant did not receive at trial: evidence that the prosecution had a duty to disclose because of a 
court order, statutory duty, or constitutional duty; evidence the prosecutor had a duty to disclose 
because the defendant specifically asked for it; and evidence that the prosecution would have been 
obligated to disclose had the defendant made a specific request. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
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A. Extrinsic-Document Identification 
In several situations, defendant-petitioners will have extrinsic 
evidence that identifies additional discovery. The Barnett court identified 
a number of cases of this type that involved internal cross-referencing of 
the previously provided discovery and the trial record.131 If a police 
report or a witness’s testimony at trial reveals that there were additional 
reports or interviews not disclosed in discovery, this internal cross-
reference to an undisclosed document would be sufficient to meet the 
reasonable-basis requirement.132 
Looking beyond the trial documents, independent habeas 
investigation also may yield evidence in support of an identifying-
evidence-based request. For example, attorneys and investigators 
conducting additional investigation post-conviction may obtain a 
declaration from a witness years after the conviction, stating that he 
made exculpatory statements to the police that the discovery record 
indicates were never disclosed at trial. An investigator may find records 
from an unrelated case where an informant is impeached using deals or 
information that the prosecution did not disclose at the defendant-
petitioner’s trial. Though these examples are not specifically described by 
the Barnett court, this type of evidence also identifies specific discovery 
that the prosecution failed to disclose at trial despite the defendant-
petitioner’s entitlement and would presumably meet the reasonable-basis 
requirement. 
Based on the Barnett court’s explicit endorsement of requests 
substantiated by cross-reference, it seems as though all extrinsic-
document identification requests will satisfy the reasonable-basis 
requirement and continue to be discoverable. This, then, is the only 
category of discovery request likely to remain unchanged by Barnett. 
B. Pattern-and-Practice Requests 
There are times when a defendant-petitioner will lack identifying 
evidence of the type described above but will strongly suspect that 
additional discoverable evidence exists because of a known pattern or 
practice of involved players or law enforcement. The pattern and 
practice relied on may be newly discovered or long-standing. 
The facts in Gonzalez present an example of a newly discovered 
pattern and practice that supports a discovery request.133 After news 
broke that the District Attorney had knowingly used the testimony of 
unreliable informants in the Los Angeles County Jail during the period 
relevant to his case, Gonzalez requested discovery relating to the 
 
 131. 237 P.3d at 985. 
 132. Id. 
 133. People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1203 (Cal. 1990). 
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jailhouse informant who testified against him.134 Although Gonzalez had 
no specific evidence that the prosecution possessed undisclosed 
information tending to impeach or discredit the informant at the time of 
his request, his suspicion was supported by the existence of a known 
conspiracy that lasted ten years and that might have impacted his case.135 
In addition to newly discovered practices like those in Gonzalez, 
long-standing patterns and practices may lead a defendant-petitioner to 
believe that the prosecutor has certain evidence that would support the 
defendant-petitioner’s theory of the case and undermine the prosecution’s 
story.136 If the evidence was not so patently exculpatory that the 
prosecutor would have been required to disclose it without a discovery 
request from the defense, then the absence of a request in the trial file 
raises the suspicion that undisclosed evidence may exist. Defendant-
petitioners requesting this type of discovery cannot show that specific 
documents within the category they are requesting actually exist (if they 
could, their request would fall into the extrinsic-document identification 
category). However, because there was no duty to disclose them at trial, 
there is enhanced suspicion that such material might exist. Examples 
include evidence that could be mitigating under a specific theory, but is 
not inherently so;137 evidence regarding the prior record of a third party 
otherwise unconnected to the case but whom the defense intends to 
argue was the culpable party;138 and evidence of a police officer’s prior 
misconduct in certain circumstances.139 
Such a scenario is illustrated by the Steele facts. For use in 
mitigation, Steele sought records regarding his cooperation with prison 
officials and law enforcement in their investigation and prosecution of 
the Nuestra Familia prison gang.140 Law-enforcement pattern and 
practice suggested that this type of information was likely to be collected 
in a prison file, which the prosecution reviewed in the course of its 
investigation. Such evidence would be considered exculpatory under 
Brady v. Maryland only if the defendant-petitioner put the prosecution 
on notice of its mitigating value by specifically requesting it.141 Unlike 
other requests for information not previously disclosed, there is no 
implication of prosecutorial misconduct in Steele-type requests. Despite 
this significant difference, the Barnett court appeared to treat a request 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. These are the kinds of requests described in the fourth Steele category. See supra notes 73–74 
and accompanying text. 
 137. In re Steele, 85 P.3d 444, 456 (Cal. 2004). 
 138. Id. at 456 n.5. 
 139. See, e.g., Hurd v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 897 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 140. Steele, 85 P.3d at 447–48. 
 141. Id. at 456. 
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like that in Steele the same as it would treat any other request beyond file 
reconstruction—by subjecting it to the reasonable-basis requirement. 
California appellate courts have not ruled on a pattern-and-practice 
request in a section 1054.9 motion since Barnett, and Barnett’s language 
shed little to no light on such cases. On the one hand, although pattern-
and-practice requests involve enhanced suspicion, they do not find 
support in the kind of direct extrinsic evidence present in the cross-
reference examples given in Barnett. On the other hand, Barnett did not 
announce a definitive evidence standard; it announced a reasonable-basis 
standard. The pattern and practice described in the Gonzalez case, as in 
the cases that challenged convictions after the Rampart Scandal, involve 
founded fears of government misconduct. Because evidence that is 
frequently kept in the course of business is asked for in the first instance 
in Steele-type requests, there is an enhanced likelihood that such 
evidence may exist. Justice would be best served by granting these 
requests; yet at best, Barnett leaves these requests in grey territory. 
Lower courts can minimize the limiting effects of Barnett by interpreting 
pattern-and-practice cases as meeting the reasonable-basis requirement. 
C. Preexisting-Duty Requests 
Each of the two previous categories involves a constitutional or 
statutory duty and something more—some extra reason to believe that 
undisclosed documents might exist. The preexisting-duty category, by 
contrast, relies merely on the prosecutor’s duty to disclose certain 
documents that existed at the time of trial. This kind of request yields 
useful evidence only when a prosecutor’s file contains documents it failed 
to disclose at trial despite a duty to do so, either intentionally or due to 
oversight or confusion about the law. 
Barnett itself contained an example of such an exclusion. Earlier in 
the proceedings, Barnett had submitted a discovery request that 
mirrored a discovery order entered at trial.142 In response, the prosecutor 
produced police reports that had not been turned over pursuant to the 
order, despite the fact that they had been in the trial prosecutor’s 
possession.143 Had Barnett been required to make a showing that these 
police reports existed, he would not have been able to do so.144 
The Barnett court’s decision will prevent courts from granting 
discovery in response to these preexisting-duty requests based on the 
presumption that government officers have properly performed their 
duties.145 
 
 142. Barnett v. Superior Court, 237 P.3d 980, 991 (Cal. 2010) (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 984 (majority opinion). 
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In summary, although the language of section 1054.9 makes no 
distinction between file-reconstruction requests and other requests for 
information to which the defendant-petitioner would have been entitled 
at trial, the Barnett decision does. It assesses requests for material that 
the defendant-petitioner never received based on the specificity of the 
request. Whether a defendant-petitioner obtains discovery depends on 
whether his request is based on extrinsic evidence, pattern and practice, 
or preexisting duty. The Barnett court explicitly approved of requests 
that offer extrinsic evidence that a certain document has been in the 
possession of the prosecution. On the other hand, it explicitly 
disapproved of preexisting-duty requests and left uncertain the fate of 
pattern-and-practice requests. The resulting risk is that some defendant-
petitioners will not be able to identify prosecutors’ failure to disclose 
evidence they had a duty to provide, and thus that credible habeas claims 
will remain hidden. As stated by Justice Werdegar in her dissent, this 
precedent calls out for “the Legislature to reassert its prerogative in 
terms that cannot so easily be ignored.”146 
IV.  Opportunities for New California Legislation 
The California Supreme Court has, at the very least, undermined 
the legislature’s goal of providing criminal defendants with the necessary 
tools to identify and prove government misconduct. Properly interpreted, 
section 1054.9 should allow defendant-petitioners a second opportunity 
to ask for materials to that they were already entitled to receive at trial 
but either had lost or never received. Even if California courts find that 
pattern-and-practice requests satisfy the reasonable-basis requirement 
set forth in Barnett, the court’s imposition of new barriers to discovery 
for preexisting-duty-based requests threatens to deprive defendant-
petitioners of a meaningful opportunity to identify government 
misconduct and to challenge their convictions in state post-conviction 
proceedings. 
To address this judicial abrogation of legislative intent and to 
provide defendant-petitioners with the tools that lawmakers intended, 
the California legislature should heed Justice Werdegar’s call for 
clarifying legislation. The simplest and most obvious way to do this 
would be for the legislature to add a clarifying statute that rejects the 
court’s Barnett decision and returns to a pre-Barnett meaning of section 
1054.9. 
Alternatively, the legislature might better promote both justice and 
efficiency by adopting an open-file post-conviction discovery scheme. 
Such a set of laws would eliminate the gatekeeper role of prosecutors, 
thereby maximizing the ability of defendant-petitioners to identify and 
 
 146. Id. at 990 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
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prove government misconduct. The policy would also lower costs, 
because it would reduce the need for the post-conviction investigation 
now required to support more specific discovery requests without 
creating additional work for prosecutors. 
North Carolina has adopted an open-file discovery statute for post-
conviction use in death-penalty cases, which should be used as a model 
for California.147 North Carolina’s law took effect in 1996 and applies 
only to prisoners sentenced to death and pursuing a post-conviction 
challenge to their conviction or sentence.148 As in California, the North 
Carolina statute requires defense trial counsel to give its files to the 
defendant for post-conviction challenge.149 The North Carolina law goes 
further by also requiring the state to “make available to the defendant’s 
counsel the complete files of all law-enforcement and prosecutorial 
agencies involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the 
prosecution of the defendant.”150 If the state believes that the disclosure 
of any portion of the files would not serve the “interest of justice,” it can 
submit those portions to the court for review.151 The court may allow the 
state to withhold those portions only if the files “could not assist the 
capital defendant in investigating, preparing, or presenting a motion for 
appropriate relief.”152 
A California statute providing open-file discovery for defendant-
petitioners raising collateral challenges to death and life without parole 
sentences, similar to the statute implemented for death-penalty cases in 
North Carolina, would promote justice and fairness.153 The language 
 
 147. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(f) (2010) provides: 
In the case of a defendant who is represented by counsel in postconviction proceedings in 
superior court, the defendant’s prior trial or appellate counsel shall make available to the 
defendant’s counsel their complete files relating to the case of the defendant. The State, to 
the extent allowed by law, shall make available to the defendant’s counsel the complete files 
of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved in the investigation of the crimes 
committed or the prosecution of the defendant. If the State has a reasonable belief that 
allowing inspection of any portion of the files by counsel for the defendant would not be in 
the interest of justice, the State may submit for inspection by the court those portions of the 
files so identified. If upon examination of the files, the court finds that the files could not 
assist the defendant in investigating, preparing, or presenting a motion for appropriate 
relief, the court in its discretion may allow the State to withhold that portion of the files.  
 148. See id. § 15A-1415(a)–(b). 
 149. Compare Rose v. State Bar, 779 P.2d 761, 765 (Cal. 1989), with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1415(f). 
 150. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(f). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. As a result of the lessons revealed by North Carolina’s post-conviction discovery provisions in 
capital cases, the state elected to adopt open-file pretrial discovery in all felony cases. Robert P. 
Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical 
Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 257, 272–76 (2008). Changes to 
pretrial criminal discovery in California would require either a two-thirds vote of the legislature or a 
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should parallel that of the North Carolina statute, including the 
allowance of access to prosecutorial and law-enforcement files. It also 
should specifically include post-conviction access to the personnel files of 
law-enforcement officers as allowed pretrial by the California Evidence 
Code in order to identify police misconduct.154 
Open-file discovery is likely to reveal the prosecution’s failure to 
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant at trial.155 Intentional and 
inadvertent failure to disclose information in violation of a prosecutor’s 
duty is a significant problem, although it is currently difficult to 
diagnose.156 Although the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari in only 
one percent of all petitions that pass before it, it has ruled on a case 
involving Brady violations at least once each decade since the Brady 
decision in 1963.157 A review of California cases raising Brady claims 
specifically found that exculpatory information had been improperly 
withheld in 129 cases, and the failures to disclose were found material 
and reversible in sixteen of those cases.158 The results in North Carolina 
after the implementation of open-file discovery in capital cases 
demonstrate that open-file discovery does reveal Brady violations. From 
the time North Carolina’s statute was passed in 1995 to 2004, seven 
death-row prisoners were granted relief based on Brady violations.159 
 
voter initiative, whereas changes to post-conviction discovery can be passed by a simple majority of 
the legislature. See People v. Superior Court, 227 P.3d 858, 860–61 (Cal. 2010) (holding that 
Proposition 115 placed limits on the legislature’s ability to address pretrial discovery, but not post-
conviction discovery). It is because of this distinction that this Note advocates for changes to post-
conviction, rather than pretrial, discovery. 
 154. See Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1043–1047 (2011) (describing circumstances in which criminal 
defendants can discover law-enforcement personnel files); see also Pitchess v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 
305, 309 (Cal. 1974) (finding the defendant’s request for materials about prior complaints against a 
police officer were relevant to his self-defense to battery charges and discoverable for purposes of 
obtaining prior statements of unavailable witnesses, refreshing witness memory, and proving the 
character of the police officer). Pitchess materials have been considered within the category of 
information to which the defendant would have been entitled at trial had he requested it, and 
therefore discoverable under section 1054.9. Hurd v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 897 (Ct. 
App. 2006). 
 155. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material 
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). 
 156. See Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 685, 686–88 
(2006) (describing both the high number of appellate cases raising claims of Brady error and how 
Brady evidence hidden by the prosecution “may never be discovered”). 
 157. Maitri Klinkosum & Brad Bannon, Advocating for Those Left Behind: The Need for 
Discovery Reform in Non-Capital Post-Conviction Cases, Trial Briefs, Feb. 2005, at 8. 
 158. Cal. Comm’n on the Fair Admin. of Justice, Final Report 70 n.2 (2008) (describing the 
results of a study conducted for the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice by 
Cookie Ridolfi, a law professor at Santa Clara University and the Executive Director of the Northern 
California Innocence Project). 
 159. Klinkosum & Bannon, supra note 157, at 10. 
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Ineffective assistance of defense counsel also can be revealed 
through an open-file discovery system.160 In California, ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims comprised the largest percentage of 
successful claims in death-penalty cases from 1977 to 2005,161 further 
emphasizing the importance of enabling the pursuit of these claims. By 
allowing defendant-petitioners to review prosecution files for materials 
to which the defense would have been entitled only upon request, the 
defense will be able to ascertain whether trial counsel was deficient by 
failing to request certain types of discovery. 
Take, for instance, the case of Javier Ovando, whom police officers 
from the Rampart Division shot and then framed for assault and 
brandishing a firearm against a police officer.162 Fortunately for Ovando, 
one of the police officers confessed to the true course of events and the 
District Attorney filed a writ for Ovando’s release.163 However, a 
hypothetical derived from Ovando’s case is an instructive example of the 
potential effectiveness of the proposed legislation. If the offending 
officer had never come forward, and if Ovando had access to open-file 
discovery to file his habeas claim, his habeas attorney could have 
requested and received information from the personnel files of the two 
officers that were involved in the shooting.164 Such a request would have 
made sense based on Ovando’s version of events and may have led to 
evidence that would have discredited the police officers or revealed 
patterns of misconduct. 
Ovando filed a malpractice claim against the county and his public 
defender,165 and the results suggest that his attorney’s inadequate 
representation may have been substantial enough for him to prevail 
under the Strickland test on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Ovando won a $6.5 million jury verdict for malpractice based on his 
claims that his attorney “failed to adequately investigate the facts and 
circumstances of his alleged crimes, failed to adequately investigate the 
backgrounds of Officers Perez and Durden, and failed to undertake 
 
 160. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (holding that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel includes the right to competent and effective assistance of counsel); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that petitioners seeking post-conviction relief because 
of ineffective assistance of counsel must prove that the trial attorney’s performance fell substantially 
below professional standards and resulted in prejudice to the defendant). 
 161. Cal. Comm’n on the Fair Admin. of Justice, supra note 158, at 125. 
 162. Ovando v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 415, 420 (Ct. App. 2008). Though Mr. 
Ovando did not receive a sentence severe enough to entitle him to post-conviction discovery under the 
current or proposed legislation, his circumstances are still instructive. 
 163. Id. at 420–21. 
 164. See Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1043–47 (2011). 
 165. Ovando, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 422. 
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reasonable measures to locate and present the testimony at trial of 
percipient witnesses who could have exonerated Ovando.”166 
Perhaps most important, open-file discovery will allow defendants 
who suspect they have been the victims of police misconduct to review 
law-enforcement materials with a critical eye in light of new information. 
This would allow defendant-petitioners such as Gonzalez167 to review 
law-enforcement files on the informant used against him. Ovando168 
would have been able to request the records of the officers who shot and 
framed him for assault and brandishing a weapon and to review the 
prosecutor’s files for any evidence that could prove things happened the 
way he said they did. 
Not only would open-file discovery promote the presentation of 
claims necessary to the pursuit of justice, it would be a particularly 
efficient means of doing so. Because defendants would no longer have to 
find independent evidence that materials exist, as they currently do 
under Barnett, open-file discovery would reduce the time and money 
spent on defense investigation of issues that would be addressed by a 
review of the prosecution and law-enforcement files. Also, because the 
prosecution would be providing all of its files to the defense, open-file 
discovery would save the prosecution the time of culling through a case 
file for information to which the defendant would be entitled. Finally, the 
criminal legal system would be freed from the additional litigation caused 
by disputes regarding whether or not a defendant would have been 
entitled to discovery at trial and whether the defendant-petitioner can 
meet the reasonable-basis requirement. 
Conclusion 
The California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Barnett v. 
Superior Court stands to dramatically limit defendant-petitioners’ ability 
to use section 1054.9 of the California Penal Code as a tool to uncover 
evidence of government misconduct. But the court’s holding is contrary 
to California lawmakers’ intentions for creating the law. In light of the 
clandestine nature of government misconduct and the recent and 
ongoing scandals in law-enforcement offices, the Barnett decision is likely 
to perpetuate the concealment of evidence of government misconduct. A 
legislative intervention is needed both to restore and to further expand 
defense discovery rights in California. A state law for open-file discovery 
in post-conviction proceedings would provide a cost-effective means of 
promoting greater justice in cases involving government misconduct. 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. See supra notes 30–41. 
 168. See supra notes 162–66. 
